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Fifty-year-old Ma Guangjun, a defense lawyer from Inner Mongolia, accepted a controversial case he considered un-just—he decided to defend an impotent patient who had 
been accused of rape. Ma had found seven witnesses to testify for 
the defense. While witnesses almost never come to court in China, 
Ma did not want to rely solely on their written statements. “If I 
made notes and signed them,” he argued, “then the two witness-
es who were not able to write could break their word and say the 
statement was written by me, the lawyer.” Well aware that law en-
forcement often prosecuted defense lawyers for forging evidence 
simply to maintain a high conviction rate, the always cautious Ma 
decided to make his witnesses testify orally in court.
His prudence, however, did him little good. !e day after 
testifying, all seven witnesses were detained by law enforcement, 
tortured, and forced to change their statements. !e witnesses now 
claimed that Ma had coerced them into lying, accusing him of the 
precise charge he had sought to avoid. Soon after their “admission,” 
Ma was detained and charged under the notorious Article 306 of 
China’s Criminal Law (CL). For over two hundred days, Ma was 
beaten and tortured for doing little more than defending his client.1 
!e repeated abuse of Article 306 by prosecutors in China 
has largely intimidated the defense bar, rendering China’s criminal 
justice system dysfunctional. Article 306 is primarily used by pros-
ecutors at the local level. !us, understanding the reasons for its 
abuses requires detailed examination of the local incentive struc-
ture. I will argue that the abuse of Article 306 is in part a result 
of the cultural and institutional difficulties posed by the transition 
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from an inquisitorial system, in which the prosecutor was domi-
nant, to an adversarial one that formally subordinates the prosecu-
tor to judges and places them on equal footing with the defense. 
Within this climate of uncertainty, prosecutors are able to use their 
immense power against their adversaries without any real checks. 
As a result, repeal or revision of Article 306 will accomplish little if 
the local incentive structure that leads to abuse and the central poli-
tics that formed the structure are not addressed. !is paper will ex-
amine the enabling factors and current incentives behind prosecu-
torial abuse. It will then examine what reformers might learn from 
the politics and history of China’s criminal reforms in the 1990s. It 
will close with a series of structural reforms that could alter the in-
centive structure at the local level and protect defense lawyers from 
suffering harm for merely representing their clients.
THE PROBLEM
At a glance, Article 306 may seem to be an inoffensive rule of 
law provision that criminalizes the subornation of perjury and the 
falsification of evidence. But when one looks more closely at the 
text, it becomes clear that Article 306 was likely written with the 
purpose of putting criminal defense lawyers in severe professional 
jeopardy. It states the following: 
If, in criminal proceedings, a defender or agent ad litem destroys 
or forges evidence, helps any of the parties destroy or forge evi-
dence, or coerces the witness or entices him into changing his 
testimony in defiance of the facts or give false testimony, he shall 
be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three 
years or criminal detention; if the circumstances are serious, he 
shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 
three years but not more than seven years.
Where a witness’s testimony or other evidence provided, shown 
or quoted by a defender or agent ad litem is inconsistent with 
the facts but is not forged intentionally, it shall not be regarded 
as forgery of evidence.2 
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Because the opening clause of Article 306 singles out defense 
lawyers and later clauses on criminalizing evidence fabrication 
and perjury are so vague, there is widespread potential for it to be 
wielded unfairly against defense lawyers. Additionally, Article 306 
is unnecessary. Article 307 of the CL, which already adequately ad-
dresses evidence fabrication and perjury, pertains to all participants 
in the criminal justice system equally rather than only to defense 
lawyers. It also has both more appropriate punishments and clearer 
standards.3 In contrast, at no point in Article 306 or in the mam-
moth CL and Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) is it stipulated what 
it means for a lawyer to “help destroy or forge evidence” or “coerce 
the witness or entice him into changing his testimony.”4 Such am-
biguities have not been resolved through the court process because, 
as Terrence Halliday and Sida Liu note, China lacks a “satisfactory 
system of precedent where courts can settle the meanings of the 
statuary terms.”5 !is has been a boon for the Procuratorate, a 
prosecutorial body charged with both prosecuting offenders and 
with supervising all members of the criminal justice system, includ-
ing judges, police, and the defense. Article 306’s textual ambigu-
ity and the structural impossibility of clarifying statutes through 
the courts leaves the Procuracy, tasked with enforcing Article 306, 
enormous leeway in defining the context in which the law can be 
used. For them, Article 306 is easily used to harass defense lawyers 
in criminal trials. 
8LI1EKRMXYHIERH'SWXWSJ%FYWI
In the last decade, the Procuracy has indeed taken advantage 
of the ease with which Article 306 can be used. Between 1996 and 
2006, at least three hundred lawyers all across China have been 
charged under it.6 It is the favorite weapon of prosecutors—one 
study of seventy lawyers who had been criminally charged found 
that nearly 50 percent were charged under 306. No other legal tool 
was a close second.7 It is also a large problem for defense lawyers—
Professor Zhao Bingzhi at Renmin University has found that 70 
to 80 percent of the complaint cases that bar associations receive 
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from lawyers reference the threat or use of Article 306.8 Although 
a large number of lawyers are charged, investigated, or detained us-
ing 306—some for periods of years—only a small number are ac-
tually convicted. Out of a sample of fifty-six lawyers charged under 
Article 306, 70 percent were either found not guilty or were not 
prosecuted in court.9 !is suggests that “evidence fabrication provi-
sions are being used for the purpose of professional retaliation” and 
that “charges are dropped once the defense attorney is intimidated” 
and the prosecutor has secured a conviction.10 
If the purpose of Article 306 is to intimidate criminal defense 
lawyers, it has succeeded in doing so at a high cost. According to 
most observers, Article 306 is one the major factors contributing 
to the decreasing popularity of criminal defense work.11 !e Legal 
Daily, a newspaper published by the Ministry of Justice, has noted 
with concern that the percentage of defendants with representa-
tion has decreased dramatically in spite of a market increase in the 
number of lawyers in China.12 Six out of ten defendants currently 
go without representation.  In some counties, the number is as high 
as nine out of ten.13 For those who do remain in the field, morale is 
low and the quality of defense work continues to fall. As a result of 
prosecutorial intimidation, criminal defense lawyers have “adopted 
highly defensive measures to minimize their exposure to the police 
and procuracy,” and therefore avoid gathering evidence or vigor-
ously questioning witnesses.14 Ironically, and perhaps not inadver-
tently, the CPL both guarantees defendants a right to counsel and 
contains, in Article 306, a clause that fundamentally undermines 
that right. 
8LI0SGEP4SPMXMGEP4MGXYVI
Although Article 306 creates a significant problem plaguing 
criminal defense law in China, prosecutors have often abused law-
yers through other legal avenues, such as charging them with cor-
ruption, malpractice, etc.15 Even without Article 306 in place, it is 
likely that prosecutors would still find ways to harass their profes-
sional adversaries. An understanding of the political and institu-
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tional conditions at the local level that both enable and incentiv-
ize abuse by the Procuracy is therefore essential. For the sake of 
conceptual clarity, enabling factors are the institutional and cultural 
factors that make abuse possible. !e potential for abuse, however, 
does not make it certain. Prosecutors need a reason to take advan-
tage of the institutional and cultural advantages that enable them 
to abuse. To understand their behavior, an analysis of the current 




Perhaps the most significant enabling factor leading to pros-
ecutorial abuse is the incompleteness of China’s shift from an in-
quisitorial to an adversarial criminal system. !e inquisitorial sys-
tem, which was derived from the civil law tradition, pursued justice 
through an extensive pretrial investigation conducted by prosecu-
tors and/or judges. !is, in turn, limited the role of lawyers and 
trials and expanded the discretion of prosecutors.16 In contrast, the 
adversarial tradition drawn from common law tries to pursue jus-
tice through competitive trials in which the defense and prosecu-
tion are equals under an independent judge who serves as umpire. 
Although both institutions are capable of protecting rights, the in-
quisitorial system is notoriously prone to abuse in part because the 
inequality between prosecution and defense makes the trial pro-
cess a mere formality. Although the 1996 reforms to the CPL were 
intended to mitigate this power imbalance by shifting away from 
the inquisitorial model, they have actually exacerbated its effects. 
!is is in large part because the Procuracy was able to successfully 
sabotage moves toward an adversarial system and retain its power. 
China’s inquisitorial system was one in which prosecutors 
conducted investigations unrestricted by evidentiary rules, a de-
fense bar, or judges.17 !e switch to an adversarial system in the 
1996 CPL brought defense lawyers and prosecutors into direct 
competition in the trial process and gave judges the power to pick 
winners, putting the two sides into sharper conflict than ever be-
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fore. Reforms that put lawyers and prosecutors into direct com-
petition and formal equality failed to relieve prosecutors of their 
institutional advantages.18 
  Foremost among these myriad advantages is the Procuracy’s 
supervisory power over the judicial system. Indeed, the Procuracy 
not only “represents the interests of the State and the people,” but 
also functions as “the State’s legal supervisory organ” tasked with 
inspecting “the activities of the other participants as a neutral and 
objective referee.”19 !is places the prosecutor in charge of com-
plaints regarding procedural violations, extending Procuratorate 
authority over the police, lawyers, courts, detention centers, de-
fendants, witnesses, and evidence.20 While American judges settle 
pretrial disputes between the prosecution and defense, here the 
responsibility falls to the Procuracy. !e Procuratorate is thus a 
player and a referee in the criminal process. Current institutional 
safeguards that seek to avoid the conflict of interest by separating 
the supervisory and prosecutorial functions of each Procuratorate 
into two separate departments are ineffective. Officers that pros-
ecute offenders are often close colleagues of those who are tasked 
with ensuring the fairness of legal proceedings and lateral trans-
fers between departments remain common.21 !e Procuratorate 
is functionally an integrated entity without external or internal 
checks on its supervisory power.
!e absence of such checks means that the Procuracy can in-
vestigate and initiate cases against lawyers for fraud, coercion, or 
violation of Article 306 with impunity. From this perspective, the 
net effect of the CPL was to throw the weaker defense bar into a 
dangerous competition with the vastly more powerful and heavily 
entrenched procurator. Because this competition is “taking place in 
the context of great legal uncertainty, where rules are vague and 
their meanings unsettled,” the prosecution—as a judicial supervi-
sor—has the ability and power to take unfair advantage of uncer-
tainty, whether it be about evidentiary procedure, proper question-
ing of a witness, or Article 306.22
  !e second major enabling factor is culture. China’s re-
cent inquisitorial system is rooted in a long Confucian tradition. 
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Confucianism, historically at odds with Chinese and Western le-
galism, holds truth and social harmony as more important than 
legal procedure. !e inquisitorial system China adopted from the 
Soviets conformed to this ideal, as the Procuratorate was charged 
with finding the truth—often through coerced confessions—and 
the defense was effectively irrelevant.23 Prosecutors, judges, and 
the public thus find it difficult to accept the values implicit in an 
adversarial system, where the judge is an impartial referee between 
the prosecutor and defense. Instead, they continue to see proce-
dural safeguards as loopholes and legal etiquette, and view defense 
lawyers best as obstructionist and criminal accomplices at worst.24
  In this context, the rapidity with which the Procuracy has 
been made subordinate to the court and equal to the defense has 
left its professionals feeling they have lost face. As a result, they 
have fought a “series of petty but highly symbolic skirmishes, such 
as over whether prosecutors are required to stand up when judges 
enter the room and whether judges may sit at elevated podiums.”25 
To add insult to injury, private lawyers often earn several times 
more than prosecutors, a fact that prosecutors find humiliating.26 
Given this mixture of contempt and envy, the threshold for pros-
ecutors to use Article 306 when it suits their interests is far lower 
than it otherwise might have been. 
'YVVIRX-RGIRXMZIW
While the previous enabling factors make misconduct more 
likely, they do not explain why prosecutors decide to abuse their 
position. For that, we need to examine the incentive structure op-
erating at the local level, which pushes prosecutors to harass their 
professional adversaries. In the current structure, the costs of losing 
a case are high for prosecutors while the ability of the defense to 
win cases is rising as a result of the 1996 reforms. !ere are three 
major incentives preventing prosecutors from taking defeat lightly. 
As it stands, prosecutors need to win, and because it is getting hard-
er for them to win, they are motivated to cheat.
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First, the passage of the 1995 State Compensation Law 
(SCL), intended to make local government more accountable by 
allowing citizens to receive compensation when their rights are vio-
lated by the state or when they suffer undue harm, makes losing 
costly for prosecutors, both literally and figuratively. "e law al-
lows those wrongfully accused or detained to sue the Procuracy 
and police for compensation.27 Moreover, these cases tarnish the 
reputation of the prosecutors involved and can trigger an internal 
review. To avoid this situation, prosecutors have strong incentives 
to wield Article 306 to eviscerate a defense.28 A Shenzhen judge 
explained how these incentives shaped a recent trial by noting that, 
if the defense triumphed in court, “the Procuracy would have to 
compensate for the false detention of the subject ... [so] to prove the 
guilt of the suspect the prosecutor needed to prove that the lawyer 
had falsified evidence.”29 While the number of cases filed under 
the 1995 SCL is unknown, prosecutors fear the prospect of paying 
compensation and believe claims will rise if they do not maintain a 
tough line against them.
Secondly, on an institutional level, the pressure on law en-
forcement to crack down on crime is greater than ever. China’s vast 
economic transformation and the attendant social disruptions have 
produced a surge in crime that has increased six-fold since 1979.30 
Since instability threatens the party’s legitimacy, the CCP has pub-
licly made social order a key objective. It has done so by dedicating 
itself to several high-profile and effectively never-ending campaigns 
against crime, known as “Strike Hard” campaigns, during which, 
as even the government-run China Daily notes, “police usually take 
tougher measures against crime and judicial authorities hand down 
swifter and harsher penalties.”31 Since local law enforcement agen-
cies are assessed based on the number of convictions they secure, 
especially during these campaigns, they have strong incentives to 
push through as many convictions as possible. As securing convic-
tions in court grows more difficult, the police and public security 
bureaus face an uncomfortable dilemma: they “will bear much of 
the blame for failing to curb crimes while at the same time suffering 
diminished powers to fight the war.”32 In this light, Article 306 pre-
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vents irksome defense lawyers from interfering with institutional 
objectives.
  Finally, individual prosecutors have strong professional in-
centives to target their opposition, even when compensation is not 
at risk. !is is largely because law enforcement agencies are them-
selves assessed by their total number of convictions and reward 
prosecutors who help agency-level quotas. !e current bureaucrat-
ic structure is one in which pay and promotion are often directly 
impacted by a prosecutor’s win-loss record, creating strong incen-
tives to avoid losses no matter the details of a case.33 
!e pressures caused by the 1995 SCL, China’s “Strike Hard” 
campaigns, and career have mounted on prosecutors while, at the 
same time, the chance of losing in court has increased, giving pros-
ecutors a greater incentive to circumvent the system altogether. 
Two main developments toward the rule-of-law have, ironically, 
led to prosecutorial abuse. First, China’s increasingly independent 
judges are willing to declare a defendant not guilty on procedural 
grounds and have given defense lawyers some success in depriving 
prosecutors and police of techniques upon which they have long 
relied.34 Secondly, the trial is no longer a mere formality. Before 
reform, judges were part of the investigatory process. Because they 
were familiar with all of the prosecutor’s evidence, they made de-
cisions before the trial. !is changed after the 1996 reforms. As 
one judge wrote, “I now have little knowledge about the case … 
As a result, I have to listen to their arguments more seriously and 
sometimes I intentionally encourage the defense to advance attacks 
on the prosecution’s case, so as to help me examine the case from a 
different perspective.”35  Although prosecutors have the clear bal-
ance of power on their side, an increasingly independent judiciary 
is giving the defense a chance. 
In an environment where defeat is possible, China’s pros-
ecutors “find themselves feeling frustrated, embarrassed, and hu-
miliated” because they are “ill-prepared to face the unprecedented 
challenges” caused by the 1996 reforms.36 !ey therefore prefer to 
cheat rather than to play by the rules. A defense lawyer’s exculpa-
tory evidence must have been “forged,” his key witnesses must have 
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been “enticed,” and the withdrawal of his client’s confession, though 
extracted under torture, must similarly have been “coerced.”37 In 
this way, prosecutors generate convictions by circumventing the ju-
diciary and arresting their opponents, thereby forestalling the slow 
move toward procedural justice. Moreover, with only a few high-
profile uses of Article 306, prosecutors can “lock-in” the gains by 
creating the impression that defense work is futile, thereby avoiding 
the need to combat the defense or adjust to the reforms of the 1996 
CPL. And, as explained above, prosecutors can get away with this 
because the current institutional structure and cultural attitude fa-
cilitate precisely this sort of behavior. As one researcher puts it, “It 
is indeed the overall political structure that should be blamed most 
for the failure of the CPL revision in 1996.”38
THE CENTRAL POLITICS OF REFORM
If the current local political and institutional structure can be 
blamed for the abuse of Article 306 and the failure of reforms, then 
an investigation into how that structure came about is essential to 
understanding how to push for further reform. 
In the 1990s, the main impetus for legal reform was the self-
interest of the CCP. By the early 1990s, the Tiananmen uprisings 
and the decreasing salience of communist ideology left the CCP 
without a basis for its legitimacy. To remain in power, CCP elites 
turned to economic performance as a new justification for their rule, 
and began to promote the rule-of-law. First, CCP elites believed 
that the rule-of-law would create stable institutions that protected 
contracts and encouraged transactions.39 Second, they hoped that 
law could supplant the death of communist ideology and ground 
the state in the Constitution rather than decaying concepts such as 
“Mao Zedong !ought.” 
It was within this context that internal criticism from lawyers 
and academics gained influence. Reformers pushed for revisions to 
the old legal codes that had failed to provide adequate procedural 
protections. Law professors, academics, and researchers were the 
initial drafters of the 1996 CPL and 1997 CL, and, citing human 
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rights standards as the impetus for legal reform, included the pre-
sumption of innocence, participation of defense in all stages of trial, 
and the inadmissibility of evidence extracted under torture in these 
new frameworks.40  In the initial phase of reform, CCP interests 
drove the process while internal criticism directed it toward liberal 
purposes.
Although academics exercised a great degree of influence 
on the initial reform documents, bureaucratic politics determined 
most of the subsequent law. !e 1996 CPL and 1997 CL are filled 
with tradeoffs, indicating that the disjointed documents seek on 
the one hand to commit China in a formal way toward the rule of 
law, while simultaneously using local discretion and law enforce-
ment to prevent reform from going too far. Lacking a coherent set 
of goals and philosophies, these laws are instead the product of 
horse trading and political competition “so fractious that it involved 
almost every major player in the Chinese bureaucracy.”41 
!e Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate (SPP) stood to lose most from reform and 
were successful in watering down the reforms, maintaining their 
power, and creating obstacles for defense lawyers. !ey were also 
successful in delaying the reform process, launched in 1981, for sev-
eral years.42 !e Party relies on the MPS and SPP for day-to-day 
social stability, so when protests flared or the economy slowed, it 
only strengthened the position of hardliners who could then make 
a convincing case for retaining the machinery of social control in 
pristine shape and weakening the hands of reformers.43
!is is not to say that reformists did not have their own ad-
vocates in the process. !e Ministry of Justice (MOJ), an initial 
proponent of China’s shift to an adversarial system, is generally op-
posed to restrictions on lawyers’ autonomy because the Ministry 
is most relevant when lawyers are relevant.44 !e MOJ opposed 
the inclusion of Article 306 when it was introduced by the SPP 
and PSB, and failing in that, successfully secured the addition of a 
second clause to Article 306 so that unintentional violations would 
be exempted from prosecution.45 !e increasingly independent 
National People’s Congress (NPC) was also an ally.46 During the 
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1996 reform process, three thousand NPC delegates vociferous-
ly objected to a MPS amendment supported by party elites that 
would make any discharge of a police firearm in the line of duty 
a legitimate act of self-defense in all cases, regardless of the cir-
cumstances.47 Ultimately, reformers were successful in ushering in 
a formal shift to an adversarial system, with protections for defen-
dants, a foundation for an increasingly independent judiciary, and a 
greater role for the defense bar.
 As a result of bureaucratic contestation, the 1996 CPL is 
profoundly ambivalent on the question of reform. While reform-
ers were successful in winning many formal protections for the 
defendants and securing a greater place in the trial for defense law-
yers, they were unable to ensure these new provisions would be 
implemented. In contrast, hardliners were successful in ensuring 
that the SPP and PSB remained vastly more powerful than their 
adversaries, the defense lawyers. Ultimately, the CPL created provi-
sions that allowed the defense lawyers to stand up in the criminal 
process while ensuring prosecutors had the power to knock them 
back down by leaving the local political structure intact. !e lesson 
of the reform process is that textual or formal reform which leaves 
unaffected the power imbalance between prosecutors and defense 
lawyers is ineffective. For this reason, the reform of China’s crimi-
nal laws in the 1990s remains an unfinished project. 
RECOMMENDED REFORMS FOR CHINA
 If the local political structure is at fault, then the question 
becomes how to reform it. Reforms can take three main forms. !e 
first type seeks to remove the potential for abuse by revising the 
legal and textual problems in the language of Article 306. !e sec-
ond type seeks to make abuse less likely by addressing the enabling 
factors and the structure which permits prosecutorial abuse. !e 
final type seeks to address the current incentives which lead prosecu-
tors to misuse their authority. While legal reforms are unlikely to 
prove effective and structural ones are unlikely to garner political 
acceptance, the final type of reforms might be non-threatening to 
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prosecutors and reduce the likelihood of abuse.
-HIEP7SPYXMSRW8IGLRMGEP8I\XYEP6IJSVQW
On a technical level, the solutions to the dilemma posed by 
Article 306 seem relatively straightforward. First, the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) ought to repeal Article 306. Article 307 
of the 1996 CPL already sufficiently addresses perjury and the fab-
rication of evidence by judicial officers and pertains to all partici-
pants in the criminal justice system equally. In contrast, Article 306 
applies only to defense lawyers, has vaguer standards, and carries 
heavier penalties.48 
 Secondly, the NPC could raise evidentiary requirements 
for convicting lawyers of having fabricated evidence by establish-
ing a de minimis requirement so that minor testimonial discrepan-
cies would not justify prosecution.49 Additionally, the NPC might 
require more than one witness to demonstrate that a lawyer was 
guilty of engaging in or assisting fabrication. Revisions that reduce 
prosecutorial discretion over Article 306 by clarifying vague phras-
es like “entice” and “assist” might also make abuse less likely.
Unfortunately, textual reforms will not be enough to change 
the status quo. Without an attempt to change the institutional 
structure and current incentives, legal reform will go nowhere be-
cause prosecutors can always find new tools for harassment, like 
Article 307 of the CL and Article 38 of the CPL. Worse, those 
who push for textual reforms may actually harm the reform effort. 
Randal Peerenboom argues that prosecutors might prefer a de-
bate framed in terms of Article 306 rather than one over whether 
they should be held personally liable for wrongful prosecution or 
whether their supervisory role should be given to disciplinary com-
mittees.50 Pushing for the abolition of Article 306 may thus squan-
der the political capital of reformers.
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Meaningful reforms will require increasing the power of oth-
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er actors at the local level relative to the prosecution and creating 
a system of checks on prosecutorial power. In this vein, the first 
reform might be to strip prosecutors of primary responsibility over 
Article 306 and transfer it to China’s bar association, the All China 
Lawyers Association (ACLA).51 !is would reduce local abuse 
while simultaneously strengthening the professional identity of 
lawyers. While the ACLA is controlled by the MOJ, this proposal 
is unlikely to backfire because the MOJ risks irrelevance when law-
yers are not autonomous and has thus often combated efforts to re-
strict lawyers’ autonomy. Alternatively, prosecutors could maintain 
primary responsibility for Article 306 while the ACLA or courts 
are given appellate powers to prevent local prosecutorial abuse.52
Secondly, if prosecutors retain power of Article 306, reform-
ers should advocate structural provisions that deter its abuse. Cre-
ating a separate financial penalty for the false accusation of lawyers 
under the 1995 SCL might deter use of Article 306 by making it 
more costly. Holding prosecutors legally culpable and civilly liable 
for the harassment of defense lawyers would change the cost-ben-
efit analysis for all prosecutors.53 Finally, an internal reform that 
orders the withholding of promotions or bonuses for prosecutors 
who misuse Article 306 might also prove effective.54
On an institutional level, reformers should try to divide the 
Procutorate’s supervisory and investigatory functions so that the 
institution would not be both the player and referee in the criminal 
system. Banning transfers between the supervisory and investigato-
ry departments or creating a dual leadership system with one chief 
from each wing might help solve this problem. Similarly, reforms 
that incentivize the supervisory wing to take an active role in over-
seeing its investigatory counterpart might create a check on abuse. 
While it might be ideal to abolish the supervisory function 
of the Procurate outright, this is likely to be unrealistic given that 
its supervisory role is mandated by the Chinese Constitution and 
Criminal Law.55 As one author proposes, “a more feasible pro-
posal at this stage is to introduce earlier judicial involvement and 
to channel the majority of pre-trial procedural issues” away from 
the Procurate and to the courts.56 Prosecutorial control over the 
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pretrial process, the phase in which evidentiary disputes between 
prosecutors and the defense often emerge, makes defense lawyers 
exceptionally vulnerable to Article 306 and gives prosecutors the 
ability to deny defense lawyers fair access to the client or evidence. 
Giving judges control over the pretrial process would reduce the 
potential for abuse. !e relatively straightforward nature of pretrial 
disputes means that less experienced judges and recent law school 
graduates could be assigned with such responsibilities without dra-
matically increasing the court’s workload.57 
2SR8LVIEXIRMRK6IJSVQW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But the textual reforms outlined above are not enough. While 
such solutions would be effective, they would not secure the po-
litical support of the Procuracy, which stands to lose power. How-
ever, there are reforms that would address the current incentives for 
abuse without directly undermining the Procuracy’s power. !ese 
reforms can be thought of as “non-threatening reforms” because 
they offer the possibility of change without attracting the political 
opposition of law enforcement. 
First, reformers could push for the revision of the 1995 SCL, 
which holds the Procuracy liable if an individual defendant is found 
innocent. !is law motivates prosecutors to fight harder for convic-
tion even when the evidence points to the defendant’s innocence. If 
the law were revised to reduce or eliminate prosecutorial liability 
when the prosecutor ended legal action against an innocent defen-
dant, the pursuit of justice would be aligned with the interests of 
prosecutors. Additionally, raising awareness about the SCL might 
reduce the stigma that prosecutors face internally when served with 
a compensation claim and also decrease the impetus for retaliation 
against claimants.58 
Second, the Procuracy’s compliance with anti-crime cam-
paigns should be assessed not on the number of convictions se-
cured, as is current practice, but rather on the crime rate. !e cur-
rent basis for assessment is both legal and cultural. Bureaucrats 
believe that the greater the number of convictions, the safer society 
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is. !us, they incentivize prosecutors to collect the usual suspects 
and charge defense lawyers under Article 306 if they threaten the 
conviction rate. Shifting the assessment criteria to the crime rate 
will reduce the pressure on prosecutors to pursue meaningless con-
victions. Finally, the standards for internal promotions, based in 
large part on a prosecutor’s conviction rate, could be altered so as 
to be based on qualitative factors and performance reviews. Such 
reforms would probably garner support for the Procuracy while si-
multaneously changing the situation for criminal defense lawyers.
 While the mere repeal or revision of Article 306 is unlikely 
to alter the political imbalance on the ground, the aforementioned 
reforms work toward changing the political structure and incen-
tives that lead to abuse. 
CONCLUSION
!e promise of the 1996 CPL and 1997 CL was dashed by 
the realities of politics. Hardliners at the center kept the Procu-
ratorate powerful by using local discretion to undermine reform, 
thereby creating a system in which prosecutors and defense lawyers 
are officially but not actually equal. Article 306 is a manifestation 
of China’s incomplete transition from an inquisitorial to an adver-
sarial system. Defense lawyers are now responsible for clients and 
may even have a chance of winning, but prosecutors are left with 
enough power to arrest their adversaries and avoid defeat. 
Prosecutorial abuse is enabled by the fact that the Procura-
torate is both the referee and player within the criminal process and 
can therefore arrest lawyers with impunity. Cultural factors, such 
as a belief amongst prosecutors that they have lost face by being 
made formally equal to defense lawyers as well as a belief that such 
lawyers are obstructive, also lower the bar for abuse. But although 
abuse is possible, it is not certain. Prosecutorial abuse is incentiv-
ized because law enforcement agencies face pressure to generate 
convictions. With individual careers dependent on win-loss re-
cords and lawsuits resulting from defeat, the path to abuse is thus 
incentivized. At the same time, China’s criminal justice reforms are 
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making it harder for prosecutors to generate convictions as judges 
are now independent and legal procedure becomes more accepted. 
Article 306 offers prosecutors a way out of defeat even if the trade-
off is a miscarriage of justice.
Textual solutions, such as clarifying vague terms or including 
de minimis standards, might make a small difference, but it would 
not be enough. Real reform must address enabling factors like the 
Procuratorate’s power advantage. Giving bar associations power 
over Article 306, dividing the Procuratorate’s investigatory and su-
pervisory powers, or establishing penalties for Procuratorate abuse 
would protect defense lawyers. Such reforms, however, would be 
challenged by the Procuratorate. Reforms that mitigate current in-
centives for abuse rather than curb the power of the Procuratorate 
might be more welcome. Amending the State Compensation Law 
and assessing law enforcement agency prosecutors on a metric oth-
er than their conviction rate would reduce the impetus for abuse.
Unfortunately, the road to substantive reform is a long one. 
China is now in the midst of a four-year crackdown that began dur-
ing the Olympics and became semi-permanent after the financial 
crisis. Chinese elites are deeply concerned about the rise in mass 
protests, which have increased from 8,700 in 1993 to nearly 83,600 
in 2005—the last year figures were made available by the Ministry 
of Public Security.59  "ese factors have created an atmosphere of 
profound anxiety among CCP elites while simultaneously calling 
CCP legitimacy into question, thus making reform less likely but 
more necessary than ever. 
Although China has made steps away from reform in the 
last four years, that does not mean outsiders should despair. Forty 
years ago, China was a totalitarian state in the grips of the Cultural 
Revolution with a nonexistent legal community. "at China will 
dramatically change once again in the next forty years is undeni-
able; how it will change remains the central question. It is in the 
interest of the world and the Chinese people to steer that change 
toward judicial reform and more respect for human rights.
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